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T O X I C T OR T S
S C I E N T I F I C E V I D ENC E
Pending before the District of Columbia’s highest court in a case asking whether cell
phones can cause cancer is whether to replace the jurisdiction’s venerable Frye standard
for reviewing the admissibility of scientific evidence with the approach adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow, Professor David H. Kaye says. The author ana-
lyzes one aspect of the two evidentiary standards that leads him to question the trial judge’s
suggestion in Murray v. Motorola that adopting the Daubert perspective would allow
greater leeway in excluding the plaintiffs’ evidence.
Cell Phones, Brain Cancer, and Scientific Outliers in Murray v. Motorola
BY DAVID H. KAYE
T he District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Dis-trict’s highest court, recently heard oral argument1on whether to discard the very test that its prede-
cessor introduced into the law of evidence in the
celebrated—and castigated—case of Frye v. United
States.2 That was 1923, and the evidence in question
was a psychologist’s opinion that a systolic blood pres-
sure test showed that James Alphonso Frye was telling
the truth when he recanted his confession to a notori-
ous murder in the District. With nary a citation to any
previous case, the Court of Appeals famously wrote that
[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testi-
mony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.3
Now it is 2015, the case is Murray v. Motorola, Inc.,4
and the proffered evidence is expert testimony that cell
phones cause (or raise the risk of) brain cancer. The
methods used to form or support this opinion or related
ones range from what the court calls ‘‘WOE’’ (the ex-
pert says, I thoroughly assessed the ‘‘weight of evi-
dence’’),5 to ‘‘PDM’’ (I considered the evidence of cau-
sation pragmatically, with the ‘‘Pragmatic Dialog
Method’’),6 to ‘‘a literature review’’ (I read everything I
could),7 to ‘‘laboratory experiments’’ (I exposed cells to
electromagnetic radiation),8 to ‘‘experience as a toxi-
1 Ann E. Marimow, D.C. Court Considers How To Screen
Out ‘Bad Science’ in Local Trials, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 2015.
2 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3 Id. at 1014.
4 No. 2001 CA 008479 B (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 2014)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order on Expert Witness Admis-
sibility) [hereinafter Memorandum Opin.].
5 Id. at 31, 55.
6 Id. at 40.
7 Id. at 48–49, 55.
8 Id. at 61, 66.
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cologist and pharmacologist’’9 to show that ‘‘it is gener-
ally accepted to extrapolate findings from in vitro stud-
ies in human and mammalian cells to predict health ef-
fects in humans.’’10
The trial judge, Frederick H. Weisberg, ruled much of
this testimony admissible on the theory that regardless
of the extent to which the conclusions are within the
mainstream of scientific thinking, the ‘‘methods’’ be-
hind them were generally accepted in ascertaining car-
cinogenicity. He chastised the defense for ‘‘repeatedly
challeng[ing] plaintiffs’ experts on the ground that their
conclusions and opinions are not generally accepted.’’11
As he construed Frye, ‘‘[e]ven if 99 out of 100 scien-
tists come out on one side of the causation inference,
and only one comes out on the other, as long as the one
used a ‘generally accepted methodology,’ Frye allows
the lone expert to testify for one party and one of the
other ninety-nine to testify for the opposing party.’’12
Having placed himself in this box, Judge Weisberg also
asked the Court of Appeals to let him out, writing that
‘‘most, if not all, of Plaintiffs’ experts would probably be
excluded under the Rule 702/Daubert standard based
on the present record’’13 and granting the defendants’
request to allow them to appeal his ruling immediately.
Defendants then convinced the Court of Appeals to
grant interlocutory review of the evidentiary ruling en
banc, with all nine judges participating.
The question before the en banc court is thus framed
as whether to replace the jurisdiction’s venerable Frye
standard with the approach sketched in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals.14 Daubert changes the focus
from whether a theory or technique is generally ac-
cepted to whether it is scientifically valid. (See Box: The
Supreme Court Ruling in Daubert).
But does Frye really require the trial court to admit
evidence that Daubert might exclude in this case? The
trial judge suggested that adopting a Daubert perspec-
tive would permit him to be more aggressive in exclud-
ing the plaintiffs’ evidence. But this is only because of
the judge’s narrow construction of the scope of Frye.
His reasoning is that Frye is sharply limited to ‘‘meth-
odology’’;15 it does not cover the ‘‘conclusion’’ that cell
phones can cause brain cancers—even if this proposi-
tion is not accepted among knowledgeable scientists.16
However, exempting the ultimate opinion from the
strict evidentiary scrutiny reserved for potentially dubi-
ous and dangerous scientific evidence is just as much a
problem under Daubert as it is under Frye.
Daubert specifically states that the subject of the in-
quiry ‘‘is the scientific validity . . . of the principles that
underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course,
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on
the conclusions that they generate.’’17 Judge Weisberg
decided that principles or putative methodologies like
WOE, PDM, literature review, extrapolation from in
vitro experiments, and experience are generally ac-
cepted among scientists as a basis for inferring carcino-
gencity. If this is correct, and if it insulates the inference
that cellphone transmissions can cause cancer from
scrutiny for general acceptance under Frye, then it does
the same under Daubert (as originally formulated).18
Surely, weighing all the relevant data, being pragmatic,
studying the literature, considering experiments, and
using experience is what scientists everywhere do.
They do it not out of habit, but because these things
tend to lead to more correct conclusions (and less criti-
cism from colleagues) than the alternatives of not
weighing all the data, being doctrinaire, and ignoring
the literature.
The problem that Murray vividly highlights is that the
line between ‘‘method’’ and ‘‘conclusion’’ is difficult to
draw. In analyzing this issue, the trial court drew the
line in the wrong place. It is hardly obvious that the pro-
cess of reading the scientific literature and weighing
9 Id. at 74.
10 Id. at 72–73.
11 Id. at 20 n.22.
12 Id. at 28.
13 No. 2001CA008479 B (D.C. Super Ct. Oct. 1, 2014) (Or-
der Amending August 8, 2014, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der to Include Certification for Interlocutory Appeal), at 1.
14 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
15 Memorandum Opin. at 22.
16 There is precedent for this view from other Frye jurisdic-
tions. E.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 260
P.3d 857, 865 (Wash. 2011). But other opinions applying Frye
in the toxic tort context look to general acceptance of causal
theories (even if they seem to be ‘‘conclusions’’ of a sort). See,
e.g., Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 58 (Pa. 2012) (pa-
thologist’s opinion that exposure to any amount of asbestos fi-
bers can cause mesothelioma not generally accepted in view of
epidemiologic studies to the contrary and the established view
in toxicology that dosage matters); Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Chesson, 923 A.2d 939, 941 (Md. 2007) (‘‘theories regarding
the causal connection between mold exposure and certain hu-
man health effects [must be] generally accepted in the scien-
tific community’’); Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 857 N.E.2d 1114,
1122 (N.Y. 2006) (experts’ conclusions that exposure to gaso-
line fumes caused acute myelogenous leukemia properly ex-
cluded where ‘‘Plaintiff’s experts were unable to identify a
single epidemiologic study finding an increased risk of AML as
a result of exposure to gasoline’’). Even in Anderson v. Akzo
Nobel Coatings, the court indicated that its concern was avoid-
ing demands for scientific consensus on nearly case-specific
propositions. 260 P.3d at 865 (rejecting defendant’s ‘‘evermore
nuanced argument [that] to satisfy Frye, [plaintiff] must estab-
lish that the specific causal connection between the specific
toxic organic solvents to which she was exposed and the spe-
cific polymicrogyria birth defect is generally accepted in the
scientific community’’ because, with such excessive specificity,
‘‘virtually all opinions based upon scientific data could be ar-
gued to be within some part of the scientific twilight zone.’’).
17 Id. at 594–95 (emphasis added); see also Betz v. Pneumo
Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 58 (Pa. 2012) (unacceptable to ‘‘permit
experts to evade a reasoned Frye inquiry merely by making
references to accepted methods in the abstract’’).
18 In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the
Supreme Court blurred the distinction between methodology
and conclusion, and Congress later amended Rule 702 to in-
corporate this shift. The result is that in federal courts, it is less
important to draw a better line than the one in Murray and Ibn-
Thomas. See David H. Kaye, David A. Bernstein, and Jennifer
L. Mnookin, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Ex-
pert Evidence § 9.2.2 (2d ed. 2011).
David H. Kaye is the Associate Dean for Re-
search and Distinguished Professor at Penn
State Law. He is an author of The New Wig-
more on Evidence, McCormick on Evidence,
and the blog Forensic Science, Statistics, and
the Law. He can be reached at kaye@psu.edu.
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that evidence represents what the Frye court called a
‘‘scientific principle or discovery.’’ A literature review
or even a more formal meta-analysis is a way to discern
whether science has made a bona fide discovery. In
contrast, in Frye the requirement applied to the alleged
discovery itself—the specific theory that conscious de-
ception causes a change in blood pressure that can be
detected with a blood pressure cuff. Although Dr. Mar-
ston had published the results of experiments that sup-
ported this discovery, Frye surely could not have pre-
vailed by arguing that Marston’s method of detecting
deception was just a conclusion from an inferential
method that scientists generally accepted.
As this contrast indicates, the reasoning in Murray
(and some cases on which it relies) threatens to drain
the meaning out of the general acceptance standard. I
have voiced this concern before. Although the opinion
cites (the first edition of) Wigmore on Evidence: Expert
Evidence,19 it ignores the warning that
Occasionally, however, courts define the theory or method
at so high a level of abstraction that all kinds of generally
applicable findings can be admitted without attending to
whether the scientific community accepts them as well
founded. For example, in Ibn-Tamas v. United States, [407
A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979)], the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that a psychologist’s theory of the existence
and development of various characteristics of battered
women need not be generally accepted because an overar-
ching, generally accepted methodology—clinical
experience—was used to study the phenomenon. The prob-
lem, of course, is that such reasoning could be used to ob-
viate heightened scrutiny for virtually any scientific devel-
opment [citing, among other cases, Commonwealth v.
Cifizzari, 492 N.E.2d 357, 364 (Mass. 1986) (‘‘to admit bite
mark evidence, including an expert opinion that no two
people have the same bite mark, a foundation need not be
laid that such identification technique has gained accep-
tance in the scientific community. What must be estab-
lished is the reliability of the procedures involved, such as
X-rays, models, and photographs.’’)]. Indeed, in developing
the lie-detection procedure used in Frye, Marston applied
generally accepted techniques of experimental psychology
to test his theory and equipment. Thus, an exclusively
‘‘high-level’’ interpretation of Frye is untenable.20
The opinion in Murray also overlooks the more ex-
tended analysis in Wigmore of why causation opinions
in toxic tort cases should be considered ‘‘the thing’’ or
‘‘the scientific principle or discovery’’ rather than ‘‘the
deduction’’ within the meaning of Frye.21 It would make
no sense to ask whether psychologists generally accept
the proposition that Dr. Marston correctly measured
the defendant’s blood pressure or correctly applied
some formula or threshold that indicated deception.
Such case-specific facts do not appear before any gen-
eral scientific community for scrutiny. On the other
hand, an alleged association between elevated blood
pressure and deception, a procedure for measuring
blood pressure, and a formula or threshold for conclud-
ing that a subject is deceptive are trans-case proposi-
tions that behavioral scientists would be expected to ad-
dress in normal scientific discourse.
The same is true of claims of carcinogenicity.
Whether cell phones can cause brain cancer at various
levels of exposure are trans-case propositions that
stimulate scientific dialog. The Frye test can function
just as well (or as poorly) in vetting expert opinions that
exposure can cause cancer as in screening a psycholo-
gist’s opinion that deception can cause a detectable and
distinctive spike in blood pressure.22 In sum, denomi-
nating trans-case conclusions that have been or could
be the subject of scientific investigation and contro-
versy as ‘‘conclusions’’ that are beyond the reach of ei-
ther Frye or Daubert is a category mistake.
Courts should not be misled by the fact that a generic
conclusion such as ‘‘cellphones can cause brain cancer’’
can be written as the conclusion of an argument of the
following form: (1) when scientific studies of a possible
carcinogen, evaluated as a whole, have certain proper-
ties X, it is probably the case that exposure to that agent
can cause cancer; (2) scientific studies of the electro-
magnetic radiation emitted by cellphones and absorbed
by or passing through the cells of organisms (including
humans) have the properties X; therefore (3) it is prob-
ably the case that cellphones can cause human cancer.
The conclusion (3) is a generic, scientific claim that also
is a premise in a longer inductive argument that ends
with the specific conclusion that cellphones caused can-
cer in named plaintiffs. If plaintiffs had called a single
19 Memorandum Opin. at 19.
20 Id. § 6.3.3(a)(1) (notes omitted). The same language ap-
pears in § 5.2.3 of the first edition.
21 Id. § 9.2.3(a)&(b).
22 The Murray court distinguished between ‘‘the deductive
sciences: forensics, mathematics, applied physics, chemistry,
and the like’’ and ‘‘inductive sciences such as epidemiology or
psychology’’ for which ‘‘the [Frye] test is not a good gate-
keeper.’’ From a logical standpoint, only mathematics is de-
ductive. All the others rely on inductive reasoning. E.g., Brian
Skyrms, Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive
Logic (4th ed. 1999).
The Supreme Court Ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not rule that Frye was
antiquated or not up to job of
screening out dangerous and du-
bious scientific evidence. Rather,
the Court reasoned that in adopt-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975, Congress implicitly re-
jected Frye’s ‘‘austere’’ require-
ment of general acceptance. The
Court then read Federal Rule 702
as requiring scientific evidence to
be, well, ‘‘scientific,’’ as deter-
mined by district courts that could
look to various hallmarks of scien-
tifically warranted theories. But
general acceptance, the Court ob-
served, remained an important in-
dicator of the scientific validity
that courts had to find in order to
admit suitably challenged scien-
tific evidence.
A majority of U.S. jurisdictions
(41 according to the trial court or-
der in Murray), either by legisla-
tion or judicial decision, follow the
Daubert approach for filtering out
unvalidated or invalid scientific
evidence (although they still place
great weight on the presence of
absence of general acceptance in
the relevant scientific commu-
nity).
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medical doctor to testify to the latter conclusion, then
proposition (3) no longer would be the conclusion in a
chain of reasoning presented by the testifying expert. It
would part of ‘‘the thing from which the deduction in
made,’’ to use the language of Frye. It would need to be
generally accepted before the final ‘‘deduction’’ could
be admitted into evidence. That plaintiffs choose to par-
tition the testimony into stages with distinct experts
should not affect the reach of Frye.23
We can put the point another way: Given the usual
reasons to subject scientific evidence to stricter-than-
normal scrutiny, courts in Frye jurisdictions need to
consider whether it is generally accepted that the body
of scientifically validated findings on which the expert
relies to infer general causation is sufficient to justify,
as scientifically reasonable, the trans-case conclusion.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Daubert
originally reasoned—on the basis of Frye—that in the
absence of some published, peer-reviewed epidemio-
logical studies showing a statistically significant asso-
ciation, the causal theories (whether we call them con-
clusions or, instead, premises) of plaintiffs’ expert were
inadmissible.
The Ninth Circuit determined that body of research,
namely, ‘‘the available animal and chemical studies, to-
gether with plaintiffs’ expert reanalysis of epidemio-
logical studies, provide insufficient foundation to allow
admission of expert testimony to the effect that Bend-
ectin caused plaintiffs’ injuries.’’24 It was appropriate—
indeed, necessary—for experts to consider all the
‘‘available . . . studies,’’ but under Frye, there still had
to be general acceptance of the proposition that draw-
ing an inference of causation from studies of that num-
ber, caliber, and consistency was generally accepted as
scientifically valid. Gussying up the inferential process
as a WOE analysis (or anything else) cannot alter this
requirement. That many scientists, looking at the same
body of research, have found it insufficient to support
(3) is a reason, under Frye (as well as Daubert) to pre-
clude scientific outlier testimony that cellphones can
cause brain cancer.
In conclusion, whether or not the Court of Appeals
switches to Daubert, it should correct the trial court’s
blanket refusal to consider whether the theory that cell-
phones ever cause brain cancer at relevant exposure
levels is generally accepted. On the one hand, if the
Court of Appeals adheres to Frye, and if it agrees that
the theory is not a case-specific conclusion immune
from the normal need for strict scrutiny of scientific evi-
dence, then the Superior Court needs to know this be-
fore presiding over a lengthy and complicated trial. On
the other hand, if the Court of Appeals adopts Daubert,
then general acceptance remains important, as an influ-
ential part of a Daubert analysis.25 Wherever the in-
quiry into this factor is sited, Daubert or Frye, it should
not be skewed by a misconception of the scope of that
inquiry.26
23 Kaye et al., supra note 18, § 9.2.3(a).
24 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F. 2d 1128,
1131 (9th Cir. 1991).
25 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (‘‘Widespread acceptance can
be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admis-
sible, and a known technique which has been able to attract
only minimal support within the community may properly be
viewed with skepticism.’’) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted).
26 If the Court of Appeals adopts Daubert, it should con-
sider providing guidance on whether the gloss placed on
Daubert in Joiner and in the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 will apply in the District. See supra note 18;
David E. Bernstein & Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It’s
Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57 William &
Mary L. Rev. No. 1 (forthcoming 2015).
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